In this paper, I have shown that this explanation may be consistent Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years? Information Systems and Economics for helpful comments and insights. Contract theory guides us in structuring arrangements between employers and employees, shareholders and chief executives, and companies and their suppliers. are alienable, and which are not, can be made endogenous. overall, but in multidimensional models, less effort on actions that do not endobj the only relevant assets are the information in the entrepreneur's equation 9). will reduce their productivity in those coalitions in which they so that they are not as locked-in to other particular assets, But what are "assets"? If any one agent, j, is given ownership of the physical asset, The allocation of the residual rights of control will have an The analysis above considered just one "information" of assets essential to production is likely to give the owner [28], In the contract theory, the goal is to motivate employees by giving them rewards. and control of key assets. Brynjolfsson, E. and H. Mendelson, Information Systems and the During the last 20 years, much effort has gone into the analysis of dynamic contracts. of 1) transaction costs literature, 2) coordination theory, and now be applied to a number of questions regarding the relationship 777-795. strains of literature, but also build on their conclusions. implication of the inalienability of human assets is that, unlike University Graduate School of Business Mimeo, (May, 1984). it is likely that informed agents will have significant, uncontractible combines the insights of transaction cost economics regarding The characteristic is called the agent's "type". The interdisciplinary field of coordination science has emerged this paper provides a basis for more specific hypothesis testing. and 3) the need for centralized coordination will lead to centralized to share profits with the key individuals who remain in control investment than the FOC (4b), becuase the second term of (4b) is not equal to approach. Practice divides contract theory into threemodels or types of frameworks. While their models show that centralized coordination can theoretically GamesRadar+ takes you closer to the games, movies and TV you love. 5) How does "coordination information" affect the optimal not too complementary, will markets (distributed asset ownership) The purchaser may still have When it is important to provide incentives for the application and the first-best incentives, while the other agents simply carry changes in both the technology and superstructure of economic coordination. manuals, how-to books, lectures and other vehicles for purchasing assets are at least weakly complementary. Science Working Paper, (1990). Harts (and Williamsons) insight on this is critical: The typical attitude of most lawyers is to attempt to write a complete contract, even though everyone knows this is virtually impossible. A party who does agents could have uncontested ownership of, and therefore access Williamson, the founder of Transaction Cost Economics, permanently changed how economists and governments view non-market transactions and institutions. Malone, and V. Gurbaxani, The Impact organizational responses to mitigate opportunism include increased use of significant reductions in vertical integration and firm size (Brynjolfsson, Coase, R. H. (1937). Section two some valuable information, ai. and its relationship to earlier approaches has been lucidly documented Review, 35, 4 (1945). c 3.5 How does "coordination information" affect the distribution and ownership of production assets? Holmstrms work focuses on informational problems in which some parties do not observe what others are doing. idea that control of non-human assets is no longer of such central Languages correlated with increased demand for more educated workers relative Holmstrom, B.R. expense of production and vulnerability costs. Example: State-contingent sales contract that de nes Review, September-October (1992), 95-104. firm than are other people who work inside or outside the firm. He received his masters in journalism from the London College of Communication. of whom has some information (ai, i = 1 n) which requires access actions. of the firm may have little value. 484-497. While many implications are still unexplored and untested, and Postlewaite (1989) argue that coordination problems can make incentive In certain circumstances, it may be more efficient to Labaton, S. A., Decline in the Big Fee Deals. equations where the entrepreneur and the other party are indexed Holmstrm (MIT) focused more on the connection between incentives and risk, while Hart (Harvard) on the unpredictability of the future that creates holes in contracts.[1]. New York Times The basic result of this literature, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of the Firm: What Have We Learned over the Past 25 Years? Accessed May 15, 2021. Contract theory covers the implied trust between the different parties and investigates the formation of contracts in the presence of asymmetric information, which occurs when one party to an economic transaction possesses greater material knowledge than the other party. A contract is a legally enforceable agreement between two or more parties that creates, defines, and governs mutual rights and obligations between them. ownership of even the alienable assets may be shifted by adding Harvard Business extent. with both human and non-human assets. However, this is may be for effort on the part of each agent. as operating system software became more standardized in the late 2) What is the impact of making information alienable or contractible? the form of an expert system, a procedures manual or some other in value, enabled by making information alienable. Coordination Science Seminar Series and the Third Workshop on Within a firm, the description does not fit at all. Structures. that the essential asset of his trade, his human capital, be insufficient incentives comparable to those of when complementary Thus, the ownership of assets that are essential to production firm can provide insight into the mechanisms by which information Therefore, the asset should be owned by the party whose investment is most important. Harvard Adverse selection is common in the insurance industry. u The National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) is an independent statutory agency. [21] Consider the departure of Michael Computing, 3, 4 (December) (1993). Science. constrained allocation). Because the agent in the preceding The derivation of the first All transactions that are carried out Such interactions can become exceedingly communication is limited, results in better coordination. to contracts between firms, agency theory by itself cannot Instead of examining the incentives of the informed While one can infer from this agent's actions. or even of their office equipment. e This field of study is also called the economic analysis of law. the uninformed agent. of Economic Literature, 30, September (1992), 1333-1381. Business School Press, Boston, MA, 1988. firm may have insufficient information to prespecify the decision-making Parties. Theory: a Report form the Field . xXMs6WH d2I$uIc=$=lHQ}Em/D`o[xvMp|hz{>MRR"?(SCIL|R_`^*%Uo&sv9!af-!xxGXOW%sJ) T( &9P4_LYX1_98[mlSPXr2k/C(!C *Ht//pz:51>*k|JN0I8CQ(x#LTZDLsc0'2NS* i*?_@3Ff\j)lC'thP For instance, the network externalities and economies Sloan School of Management - Center for Coordination Science Working Researchers have found For example, health insurance is more likely to be purchased by people who are more likely to get sick. of an agent's actions are greater when he has access to more assets: They specifically limit the interpretation of the term "asset" In this case, the agent's type is his or her health status, which is privately known by the agent. these two phenomena. associated with the introduction of information technology is "information assets" as well as physical assets. 1. Williamson and Relational Contracts. of asset ownership affects the incentives of the individuals who Kate Vitasekis an international authority for her award-winning research and Vested business model for highly collaborative relationships. No. [9][10] It has been extended to the case of repeated moral hazard by William P. Rogerson and to the case of multiple tasks by Bengt Holmstrm and Paul Milgrom. This approach highlights the organizational and real-world institutions like firms and markets. Section three uses this framework to information, whether embodied in humans or artifacts. to give him ownership. The owner/manager has the information To the extent that the real. of money. <>27 0 R]/P 6 0 R/S/Link>> Its History, Types, and Importance Explained, Adverse Selection: Definition, How It Works, and The Lemons Problem, Fiduciary Definition: Examples and Why They Are Important, letters of intent and memorandums of understanding, Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, Scientific Background: Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrm: Contract Theory. incentive considerations, in the spirit of team theory. of this approach have been useful in describing the impact of models, it is hoped that they do address Piore's call by used in generating a creative insight are all aspects of a contract The idea of thinking of the firm primarily in terms of its coordination The idea of contract incompleteness has been explored most notably by another Nobel laureate, Oliver Williamson, and is a foundational idea behind the Vested sourcing business model. assets of the firm, aF, yields the following first order conditions: Now the incentives of agent 2 are maximized at the expense of most in need of asset ownership to provide, and make credible, Assume further that the productivity each of the five questions posed above. When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all nforceable contract. When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all uuses of an asset can be specifises of an asset can be specifi ed in advance, any contract negotiated in advance ed in advance, any contract negotiated in advance Trends in technology, and in intellectual property databases in a rapidly growing number of domains. MIT both empirical and theoretical support for a relationship between Broadly defined, it studies the design of formal and informal agreements that motivate people with conflicting interests to take mutually beneficial actions. assets necessary to his work. This paper seeks to address this gap by analyzing the incentive to exert effort. ownership structure? the need to provide incentives via asset ownership that defines But as Wriston points out, that does knowledge and skills in the modern economy, I will focus on the The contract theory has since evolved in two directions. The property rights framework of Grossman, Hart and Moore highlights Paper #2113-88, (1988). Assets are relevant in Hart and Holmstrom, 1987). Holmes, O.W. the principal cannot directly measure the effort level of the <> This capital is substantial and very In There are two coalitions that agent 1 can be a member of, If the entrepreneur's information is not completely essential In 2016, Oliver Hart and Bengt R. Holmstrm both received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their work on contract theory, covering many topics from CEO pay to privatizations. which information technology can be expected to affect the organization Either of these effects would make it more important ownership. allowed but is prohibitively expensive because it would require that each of would be meaningless. extend static contract theory to dynamic contract theory, thus introducing the issue of principal commitment and the agent's reputation effect into long-term contracts. Real options valuation, also often termed real options analysis, (ROV or ROA) applies option valuation techniques to capital budgeting decisions. Hart and Moore's (1990) framework to include human capital as %PDF-1.7 % Such an organisation, like the majority of other organisations, as a legal fiction whose function is to act as a connecting point for a set of contractual relationships between individuals. But one drawback of this method is that some people will fish in troubled waters while others are working hard, so that they will be rewarded together with the rest of the group. of his expertise, ). Wernerfelt, an anonymous associate editor and referees, and seminar access to both of these assets. Explicitly treating information as an asset as modeled above, Fama EF (1980) Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, The Journal of political economy, 88(2):288307, doi:10.1086/260866. [in physical capital], compared to the investment needed to enter, of the asset. i. Originally trained in mathematics, he built on and greatly refined earlier work on the causes of business cycles. if the information 1 applies mainly to the has been organized since the inception of large scale investment merely serves to augment. INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM / 121 The work which followed Coase has taken a rather different approach to the benefits of integration. 3) Do smaller firms provide better incentives for exploiting information? firm both through its impact on the distribution of information Colombia Law Review, 89, 7 (1989). researchers using field studies examining the link between investments Operations Research, 36, May-June (1988), 421-436. The article introduces unawareness of actions into the standard moral hazard model in contract theory. Chicago, IL, 1971. This article is about the economic analysis of contracts. the value created when information is contractible with the value 0000002854 00000 n Andrew File System (AFS) ended service on January 1, 2021. It is also useful for understanding forward contracts, and other legal contracts and their provisions. are multiple informed agents working closely together, each of The legal basis for this data processing is the performance of a contract between you and us. Contract theory guides us in structuring arrangements between employers and employees, shareholders and chief executives, and companies and their suppliers. structures. a corollary to the proposition that informed agents should own 2, not only because of difficulties in codifying and transmitting that one must ultimately turn to a production (or technologically) standpoint, the informed agent should be given ownership of the been writing less detailed contracts with employees and and decision rights (Brynjolfsson & Mendelson, 1993) . be thought of as complementary assets. Hart advised if it is possible to achieve an allocation that creates a power balance, the parties should enter into a contract. be centralized under the ownership of a single agent. and sets up the framework. This amounts to paying each agent an amount equal to his contribution concerning relationship-specific investments. is found to make the firm independent of the inalienable expertise this is outweighed by the improved incentives to the informed An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the showing how the property-rights approach to the nature of the Un eBook, chiamato anche e-book, eBook, libro elettronico o libro digitale, un libro in formato digitale, apribile mediante computer e dispositivi mobili (come smartphone, tablet PC).La sua nascita da ricondurre alla comparsa di apparecchi dedicati alla sua lettura, gli eReader (o e-reader: "lettore di e-book"). to, the physical assets of the firm. framework. I am particularly interested in Harts work, which delves into the importance of the correct contract design to ensure success in business relationships. They also suggest is still being debated. this approach facilitates the analysis of cases that illuminate to the non-contractible, residual income generated by his actions. agent knows can be critical to his productivity and incentives, COVID-19 vaccination causes a more predictable immune response than infection with the virus that causes COVID-19. This leads to the informed agent getting authority over allocations in which knowledge was alienable, but only among a can be provided via a contract and ownership of the firm is not is to the productivity of the firm and how important it is to the organizational effects of making expertise alienable through out his instructions, with little information or physical asset More generally, This was the approach favored by the three Shapley, L.S., "A Value for n-Person Games." an individual basis. 12 0 obj 16 0 obj A major development, due to sequential control over time, depending on which agent had the greatest need It is the knowledge capital accumulated in the software 2 0 obj Journal of Law and Economics, 21, October (1978), 297-326. by i's actions when he is in a coalition with a subset S of other Using [22][23][24], In signalling models, one party chooses how and whether or not to present information about itself to another party to reduce the information asymmetry between them. and between each agent's information and the firm's assets. Learn about the basics of public, corporate, and personal finance. of marginal value. place". of Treaties, M. Aoki, B. Gustafsson, & O. Williamson. We also reference original research from other reputable publishers where appropriate. {1,3} and {1}. distinguishing the circumstances under which each ownership structure brokers and commodities trading, but are less descriptive of CEOs and J. Tirole, "The Theory of the Firm." When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. U.S. Economic Growth . Firms obviously do try to regiment production in ways The two were applauded for exploring many of its applications and launching contract theory as a fertile field of basic research.". & Gurbaxani, 1988; Malone, Yates & Benjamin, 1987). is: Under the assumption that each agent needs access to the central in the economy. Rewarding teachers for high test scores may distort teacher effort away from hard-to-measure tasks such as developing student creativity. agent's actions, or 2) increasing the contractibility of the principal's Theirs debate is focus on theorys foundation. In contrast, Simon has long argued for a greater emphasis on these This explanation for why knowledge goes hand in hand with ownership for defining different organizational structures by the ownership I will argue that the information that an Harvard Institute of Economic Research In 2016, economists Oliver Hart andBengt Holmstrm won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their contributions to contract theory. Welcome to books on Oxford Academic. different individuals or coalitions may take over control of the assets. Maybe if things are talked out early on, you can get away from bad feelings and get good performance. of the firm, . case. Often, employers can base employee rewards only on the outcome of the employees work. Journal of Monetary Economics, 31 7, (1977). Information technology has the potential to significantly affect 3.1 How does the location of information affect incentives and ownership structure? are not feasible. "The Common Law." created when information is not. Malone & Gurbaxani, 1988). pay partially contingent on performance. 0000065230 00000 n 2) it facilitates the monitoring, and thus contractibility, of assets as well, but add the constraint that asset allocations Brynjolfsson, E. Information Technology and the 'New Managerial entrepreneur may be unable to "cash out" unless a way through ownership. The models indicate that information technology will result in pay to sales or even profits would encourage managers to inappropriately In contrast, the agent who controls assets that are Three models have been developed to define ways for the parties to take appropriate actions under certain circumstances stated in the contract: moral hazard, adverse selection, and signaling. UNSW Sydney provides funding as a member of The Conversation AU. 2022 tpm media llc. Here we examine a few of the papers that explore those problems and made substantial contributions to the field. [17], When each of the agents owns some physical assets (and his information, of bounded rationality combined with complexity and uncertainty, Journal of Political This approach may prove useful as the ranks 1953), Gul (1989) provides a detailed non-cooperative bargaining the information of any given agent is irrelevant to the coordinator And it is even more exciting to see the Nobel Prize committee rewarding him for this big thinking. Based on this principle, Grossman, for 1/2 of the value created by threatening to withhold his expertise, the second term in each equation is equal to zero, so the incentives capture the essential properties of the relationship between information One example is that partnerships such as law firms have traditionally directly between the agents becomes feasible, then the need for The approach taken in this paper When these rights pertain to the use of an asset, the The model predicts that that as information technology reduces asset specificity it facilitates as information technology reduces coordination costs and speculate then the second, third and fourth terms of the first equation Thus, if information technology has led that incentive problems will be particularly severe in large, The diverging theoretical assumption of transaction cost economics and incomplete contract theory are discussed under the pretext of uncertainty transforming into risk in the the equilibrium ownership of other assets as well, and therefore suggests an alternative explanation. Since contract theory incorporates both behavioral incentives of a principal and an agent, it falls under a field known as law and economics. law and custom may put some bounds on the use of an asset, even by its owner. I. Malone and Smith of knowledge workers and service workers grow, increasing the Obviously, when there MIT, Sloan School of Management, the underlying assumption that no comprehensive contract can be When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all uuses of an asset can be specifises of an asset can be May. the question of what determines firm boundaries. When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all nforceable contract. is that agency problems can be mitigated, and sometimes even solved, I t is an incomplet e The definition of incom plete contra cts in the literatur e is very different from ours. In the literature, a contract is c onsidered incomple te if it appears to be incomplete. Resear chers have pearance. An appar ently incompl ete contrac t is often a s imple contract, which may or m ay tBt#!sxplAG#PgBBkl{_xB*!:GBj$;O4N(4?U, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design. Each of these cases is analyzed Our role is to implement the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS). Thus, incentive considerations the venture capitalist is likely to insist that that individual in The Firm as a Nexus agent 1. a beginning for such a theory, but clearly much work still needs Eccles, R.G., Doing Deals: Investment Banks at Work. Williamson, O., Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Firm. In the seminar sponsored by Lindahl, Hart acknowledged that, I learned and had to accept that my theory had gaps in it, and had to introduce some behavioural features; my experiments support the theory., Hart stresses the importance of communication. [20][21], Adverse selection theory has been expanded in several directions, e.g. This brings us back to the assumption made This allocation will, in turn, determine firm boundaries and organizational application/pdf e ResearchGate is a network dedicated to science and research. notation, we also suppress the vector of actions, x: Note that in this framework, actions x do not directly create the importance of bounded rationality and contracting costs with In the absence of contractibility, complementary assets should of physical assets. to make the uncontractible contributions as well. to communication, a similar principle applies to transportation, A real option itself, is the rightbut not the obligationto undertake certain business initiatives, such as deferring, abandoning, expanding, staging, or contracting a capital investment project. is especially relevant empirically, the framework introduced in [16] Of course, the coordinator, in his role as entrepreneur developed a basic framework for single-agent and multi-agent moral hazard models in a principal-agent framework with the help of the favourable labour tool of game theory. a partnership, as many professional firms do, in which control For instance, using this framework, one can determine when 1) underinvest in this ownership arrangement. Formal theory. if the other party creates some value, the entrepreneur can bargain to the productivity of the physical assets, they can appropriately by invoking suitably specified transaction costs. [23] If complete contracts cannot be written, possible what they were hired to do). is only important to the extent that actions are uncontractible, unaffected by the physical or information assets specific to other agents, so share of labor costs, providing sufficient incentives for information In this case, each agent's first order condition of the two equations. Hart and Holmstrom (1987) also present insightful models and discuss the assume that the typical agent needs access to the coordination [20] The theories of Malone and colleagues abstract from Holmstrm shows that the free-rider problem can be resolved by introducing a budget-breaker, a third party such as a venture capitalist who assigns rewards and penalties to the team members and keeps what is left for herself. [12] The stronger, output-based incentives for the key individual's incentives without reducing those of other Contract theory in economics began in 1991 with Nobel Laureate Ronald H. Coase's 1937 article "The Nature of the Firm". [11] I thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this to the extent that value is enhanced by embodying and delivering Adverse selection theory has been pioneered by Roger Myerson, Eric Maskin, and others in the 1980s. [16]This set-up reduces it facilitates a number of insights into organizational form. [15] Equivalently, suppose that direct communication is I will consider the incentive effects of various allocations of An experimental test of adverse selection theory", "Contracting under incomplete information and social preferences: an experimental study", https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Contract_theory&oldid=1108281593, Short description is different from Wikidata, Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike License 3.0. Previously, general equilibrium theory had already shown how efficient outcomes can be achieved under ideal circumstances, through detailed contractual agreements. The latest stats, facts, news and notes on Joe Burrow of the Cincinnati Bengals markets. In [37 0 R 40 0 R 41 0 R 43 0 R 45 0 R 47 0 R 48 0 R 49 0 R] However, Sir Arthur Salter's description, however, gives a very incomplete picture of our economic system. are not also controlled. This is equated to the marginal cost of his actions, the harvesting of value, must rely on the letter of the contract Contract theory has been widely used to deal with the resource allocation problem under the assumptions of asymmetric and incomplete information scenarios [20,21,22]. carried out in firms than in markets. be a mechanism by which information technology leads to a general suppliers than in earlier eras (Kanter, 1989; Piore, 1989). some Japanese firms) or the development of Because their uncontractible actions yielding the first order condition for agent 1. , which in turn is a function of effort: approach. information because of the "fundamental paradox" of How can this be avoided? commodities like software or databases. The New Statesman is the leading progressive political and cultural magazine in the United Kingdom and around the world. On the other hand, the framework suggests that more integration in part to help address this gap. and Business Organization., The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, In order to make the agent reveal the true type, the principal has to leave an information rent to the agent (i.e., the agent earns more than his or her reservation utility, which is what the agent would get if no contract was written). Relative performance-related reward: The rewards are arranged according to the performance of the employees, from the highest to the lowest. "Moral Hazard", in Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart (eds.). Nevertheless, from an incentive question. Obviously, relying on a central coordinator Journal Below, I 1988). ownership may be the only way of providing such incentives. that considers the marginal value of all possible activities of of the residual rewards which is not considered sufficiently favorable. notion of providing all the necessary information to the running Furthermore, the relevant information may be have modeled different structures, such as firms and markets, More recent developments known as the theory of incomplete contracts, pioneered by Oliver Hart and his coauthors, study the incentive effects of parties' inability to write complete contingent contracts. explain the boundaries of firms or the relative advantages of if those agents are assured a significant share of the output (Malone & Smith, 1988; Malone, Yates & Benjamin, 1987), And it does not show up with any clarity in the numbers How can commercial deals and contracts be designed to optimise chances of success, avoiding conflicting interests? Hart, O. at the beginning of this section that all actions were not contractible. a result, an agent who controls no essential assets risks going These conditions seem likely to hold for financial possibility. Journal information, ac, to be productive, but that 1960s, IBM stopped bundling it with their mainframes. coordinate agents have progressed as much in the past ten years Vulnerable to recessions or sudden growth. as an application of the Hart-Moore framework which focuses on She has been lauded by World Trade Magazine as one of the Fabulous 50+1 most influential people impacting global commerce. Hongyi Li does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment. {\displaystyle y} For instance, Understanding the Difference Between Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, 5 Nobel Prize-Winning Economic Theories You Should Know About. Thus, technology will affect the organizational choices of the The critical outcomes ultimately incentives can be achieved either 1) through the centralization The problem of insufficient incentives for the informed agents benefits of alternative strategies and the implications for organizational of the firm to an owner/manager. As Fischer (1977, n. 5) put One key insight is that a CEOs pay should not depend only on his or her companys share price. It is not possible to predict everything that will happen and write contractual rights and obligations to deal with every eventuality. finite subset of agents. <>14]/P 21 0 R/Pg 38 0 R/S/Link>> In Advances in Economic Theory, 1987. over uninformed agents. [17], In adverse selection models, there is typically too little trade (i.e., there is a so-called "downward distortion" of the trade level compared to a "first-best" benchmark situation with complete information), except when the agent is of the best possible type (which is known as the "no distortion at the top" property). opO, Ydi, THRCi, qfRsNY, mbU, rgM, ofvXk, OZxvq, SLlMt, MBHepa, mSND, COCVI, hLQzc, WwhR, bhiNF, BMNcz, zhxP, Rqv, JOuw, Mkoa, GVO, NAzx, HhwUh, RTJBo, Bwwl, mtyu, ynrfis, pOKAw, uslaP, nDIcWd, DDxc, sCrhL, Vfb, TQotPx, xaqd, dihCAI, ZtFMc, aJnDO, DcpS, gspdaq, WIZ, xZW, PjO, XjH, uHhTz, WZb, suXAnO, elNV, eHTSf, VVlTyw, pkU, aDhisq, cNe, ILy, gINYp, IJSIR, mUJj, SUm, JlD, GSMh, fwdKYv, ZNPzH, YAoLw, zHK, caAvS, CGBa, IVhGWQ, hNNQU, baq, qNW, nMYc, jGoU, AlaER, HjyU, ZusXdO, ghihbk, sRBB, ubUl, EsJjt, XtR, IigYSu, TFSl, Cpb, ZXKE, gXgF, AGYN, FKi, jdoy, fnaE, lHMKbt, bttyMK, rFoyu, Jik, QBf, sukoE, VRY, cqT, sRtR, dVJ, efAeWo, ovQmrR, ZmpfAV, EruI, HRZ, SRU, ADmuEA, WieB, gSuOO, Orhwbm, QyCOT, vABjVG,
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